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Advances in cognitive and behavioral science reveal that the way op-tions are presented, what is referred to as ‘choice architecture’, strong-ly influences our decisions. We tend to react to a particular option-
differently depending on how it is presented to us. These discoveries inspired 
nudging, the idea that people’s decisions and behaviors should be influenced 
in predictable, non-coercive ways by making small changes to the choice 
architecture. Central to the debate on nudging is the question of whether it is 
morally permissible to intentionally nudge other people. Libertarian paternal-
ists maintain that this can be the case.
In this paper, I differentiate between type-1 nudges and type-2 nudg-
es according to the thinking processes involved in each. With this distinction 
in hand, I present the libertarian paternalistic criteria for the moral permis-
sibility of intentional nudges. Having done this, I motivate an objection to 
type-1 nudges. According to this objection, type-1 nudges do not appear to 
be relevantly different than standard cases of manipulation, and manipula-
tion is morally problematic. While I show that this objection fails, I argue 
that its evaluation raises a different challenge for Libertarian Paternalism. The 
libertarian paternalistic criteria fails because it ignores the moral distinction 
that exists between different kinds of nudges. That is, the distinction between 
what I call ‘counteractive’ and ‘non-counteractive’ nudges. I end by suggest-
ing a revision of the criteria that avoids the problem.
NUDGING
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein define ‘nudge’ as “any aspect ofthe 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economicincentives.”12 
‘Choice architect’ refers to a person responsible for presenting options.3 Their 
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decisions about how options are presented affect the decisions others make. 
This is supported by research that suggests that we commonly make irrational 
decisions due to systematic errors in how we reason.4 These errors result from 
heuristics, which are rules-of-thumb people use to make decisions. Heuristics, 
although sometimes accurate and useful, often lead to “severe and systematic 
errors,”5 called ‘cognitive biases’ that result when people choose what the heu-
ristics suggest even when these are poor options.6 Thus, even when we make 
“good” decisions (outcome-wise), those decisions are still irrational (in some 
sense) when they are the result of biased decision-making.
Kahneman (2011) describes two thinking systems, System 1 and 
System 2, which Thaler and Sunstein refer to as ‘Automatic System’ and 
‘Reflective System’ respectively. System 2 thinking is deliberate, controlled, 
effortful, and conscious. System 1 thinking is rapid, uncontrolled, effortless, 
and subconscious.7 Based on this distinction, it is possible to differentiate 
between two types of nudges: type-1 and type-2 nudges. The latter engages 
people reflectively—they engage System 2—whereas the former does not— 
they engage only System 1. Hansen and Jespersen (2013) offer the plate-size 
nudge as a type-1 nudge example.8 It consists of reducing the plates’ size in 
cafeterias, which typically reduces consumers’ food intake, and typically leads 
to a calorie intake reduction as well. This usually happens without engag-
ing the subject’s reflective thinking because of biases that result in mindless 
eating.9 The typical behavior is to first fill the plate with food and then eat the 
food typically without reflecting about it.10 A type-2 nudge example with the 
same goal—reducing calorie intake—is placing nutritional labels besides the 
food along with placards encouraging low-calorie food consumption. Here, 
the nudge works by engaging diners’ reflective thinking when they read the 
information and reflect on their food choices (which typically results in diners 
consciously choosing lower-calorie foods or reducing the food amount they 
put on their plate). These examples illustrate the difference between type-1 
and type-2 nudges. That is, type-1 nudges engage people subconsciously— 
they “work in the dark”11—whereas type-2 nudges engage peoplereflectively.
LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM
Libertarian Paternalism concerns how options should be presented. It 
is motivated, in part, by the unavoidability of choice architecture. When op-
tions are presented, they must be presented in some way. Further, any way of 
presenting the options inevitably influences people’s decisions.This, coupled 
with the fact that people often make irrational decisions, according to liber-
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tarian paternalists, can make intentional nudges morally permissible. Since 
nudging will inevitably occur, choice architects should nudge well.
However, an intentional intervention is not morally permissible mere-
ly in virtue of being a nudge. Libertarian paternalists propose a criteria for 
the moral permissibility of intentional interventions (hereafter ‘LPC’), which 
gives a set of sufficient conditions for the moral permissibility of an inten-
tional intervention. According to LPC, any intervention that is (i) a nudge, 
(ii) transparent, and (iii) aimed toward the welfare of those being nudged is 
morally permissible.12 Here (i) requires that the intervention must preserve 
freedom of choice—it cannot forbid or attach incentives or consequences to 
options13; (ii) requires that the influence must be easy to resist—people must 
be able to choose a different available option14; and (iii) requires that the 
intervention must be justifiably intended to make people better off—it must 
have people’s best interest in mind. We can thus summarize LPC as the claim 
that intentional interventions are morally permissible if they preserve freedom 
of choice by means of transparent and welfare-aimed nudges.15
To see LPC applied to a case, consider the following example:
Cafeteria
Jess is a cafeteria manager who decides the way in which food is 
displayed. After reading some psychology studies, she learns that the 
food order at cafeteria lines substantially determines what ends on 
diners’ plates—the majority of people tend to select the food that is 
placed first in line.16 Aware of this, Jess now knows that whatever she 
decides regarding food placement will influence her diners’ choices. 
So, she asks herself: “How should I arrange the food?”
Jess could arrange the food: (a) So that diners are better off;17 (b) at random; 
(c) to maximize her profits; (d) by banning all unhealthy foods.
Option (d) limits the available options, so it fails to meet (i) of LPC. 
Thus, in this case, option (d) is not a permissible intervention under LPC. 
The remaining options (a–c), all meet condition (ii) of LPC because they do 
not make it significantly more difficult for diners to choose other available 
food. However, not all (a–c) satisfy (iii). Option (b) fails to satisfy (iii) be-
cause to arrange the food at random is to consciously ignore the diners’ best 
interests. Option (c) fails to satisfy (iii) because it either reflects the architect’s 
selfish purposes or fails to even consider the diners’ welfare. Therefore, from 




Although nudges have been used to positively influence behavior in 
various settings18, they have been heavily criticized. A common objection 
targets their moral permissibility by appeal to manipulation.19 This objection 
claims that although nudging can be morally permissible, there is a particular 
subset of nudges that is impermissible in virtue of being manipulative.
THE MANIPULATION OBJECTION
The charge from manipulation is that type-1 nudges are manipulative 
in a way that type-2 nudges are not, and that this makes a moral difference.20 
The objection claims that a nudge is manipulative if it influences people with-
out sufficiently engaging their reflective and deliberative capacities. 21,22 The 
charge from manipulation can be presented as follows:
The Manipulation Objection (TMO)
1. All interventions that engage people only subconsciously are 
manipulative.
2. Type-1 nudges engage people onlysubconsciously.
3. Type-1 nudges are manipulative.(1–2)
4. All manipulative nudges are morallyimpermissible.
5. Therefore, type-1 nudges are morally impermissible. (3–4)
Note that TMO makes no claims about the moral permissibility of 
type-2 nudges. This is motivated by the desire to keep some nudges while 
excluding others. The desire to leave type-2 nudges unscathed is itself moti-
vated by the assumption that type-2 nudges are not manipulative (or at least 
not manipulative in the relevant sense), and thus not morally problematic, 
because they engage people consciously.
Subliminal messages23 engage people only subconsciously.24 Without 
getting into empirical details, suppose that subliminal messages are capable 
of influencing people’s choices. Suppose also that, as part of a public health 
campaign, subliminal messages encouraging calorie intake reduction are 
introduced in TV programs. As a result, many people subconsciously reduce 
their calorie intake. However, they are unaware that they are doing so, largely 
because they are unaware of the subliminal message itself. Even though the 
outcome may be desirable, the intuition is that such a use of subliminal mes-
sages is manipulative. This intuition gives reasons to accept premise 1.
Premise 2 is true by definition and premise 3 follows from 1 and 2. 
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Premise 4 can be motivated by appeal to autonomy. Hausman and Welch 
(2010) define ‘autonomy’ as “the control an individual has over his or her own 
evaluations and choices.”25 They argue that when nudges do not involve “ra-
tional persuasion,” the subject’s autonomy is diminished.26 Here the degree of 
reflection that takes place in an individual’s decision-making is proportional 
to the amount of autonomy they exercise. Since manipulative nudges engage 
individuals only on subconscious levels, the degree to which they exercise 
their autonomy, if at all, is very low. The idea is that the choice architect 
potentially has more control over the individuals’ choices than the individuals 
themselves. It is such a diminishing of autonomy what makes type-1 nudges 
morally impermissible according to TMO.27
LPC makes no distinction regarding which System (1 or 2) is engaged 
in nudging.28 Thus, under LPC type-1 nudges and type-2 nudges are equally 
permissible. If TMO succeeds and all type-1 nudges are morally impermissi-
ble, then the LPC’s sufficiency claim is false because LPC fails to account for 
the moral difference between type-1 nudges and type-2 nudges.
IMPLICATIONS
TMO makes a moral distinction between type-1 nudges and type-2 
nudges. This distinction is motivated by the desire to leave type-2 nudges 
unscathed, which is problematic. Such project rests on the assumption that 
type-2 nudges exist independently from type-1 nudges, but this is simply 
not the case. While type-1 nudges and type-2 nudges are exclusive—a nudge 
is either of the type-1 or type-2 variety—they are importantly related. It is 
impossible to cleanly separate them because while System 1 can—and often 
times does—operate on its own, System 2 always depends on System 1. For 
instance, in the nutritional labels type-2 nudge example, reading and reflec-
tion only come into the picture after the subject notices and reacts to the 
placards. However, without the initial reaction (System 1), there would be no 
reflection (System 2). There is simply no way to skip straight to engaging the 
subject’s System 2 thinking.
Given that the distinction between these types of nudges is not as 
clear as it is assumed by proponents of TMO, if the objection is successful, it 
not only undermines the moral permissibility of type-1 nudges but the moral 
permissibility of type-2 nudges as well. In other words, if type-1 nudges are 
morally impermissible, and type-2 nudges cannot exist without type-1 nudg-
es, then there would be no permissible nudges at all. By arguing that type-1 
nudges are impermissible, proponents of TMO inadvertently make the case 
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that all nudges are morally impermissible. This is a radical result. If TMO 
succeeds, many everyday interactions would be morally impermissible.
To appreciate the radical nature of TMO’s conclusion, think about 
the prevalence of nudges in our everyday lives. People dress well for job in-
terviews which nudges employers to take them seriously, students raise their 
hands which nudges professors to call on them, people make recommenda-
tions to friends which nudges them to make particular choices, etc.
All these ‘everyday nudges’ would be impermissible if we accept 
TMO’s conclusion. To accept TMO’s conclusion is to accept that we do 
something morally wrong much of the time. This is unreasonable. TMO 
proves too much. Therefore, its conclusion should be rejected.29
This way of rejecting the objection relies on the absurdity that results 
from its conclusion. This rejoinder claims that something goes wrong in the 
argument for TMO, but it fails to identify what exactly that is. Thus, it is not 
a satisfying solution. Something else should be added to complement this 
rejoinder. Something that can help us point out what goes wrong.
EVALUATION
Rejecting that all type-1 nudges are impermissible is not the same as 
accepting that all type-1 nudges are permissible. There is an important differ-
ence between type-1 nudges like the plate-size nudge and interventions like 
subliminal messages that creates a moral distinction between them. In what 
follows, I address Thaler and Sunstein’s attempt to make such a distinction.
1. Monitoring
Thaler and Sunstein condemn subliminal messages because it is 
impossible to monitor them.30,31 They justify this by appeal to LPC’s transpar-
ancy condition. With this understanding of transparency, they implicitly in-
troduce unreasonable expectations about people’s capacity to monitor nudges. 
On their account, for a nudge to be transparent, it must be practically moni-
torable; and for it to be practically monitorable, the nudge must be practically 
detectable. This brings about a problem. In the plate-size example, the nudge 
is not practically monitorable.32 Thus, if subliminal messages are impermissi-
ble because they are not practically monitorable, then nudges like the plate-
size nudge and many ‘everyday nudges’ are impermissible too. Here, we can 
see that the transparency condition is extremely restrictive. This is sufficient 
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reason to not accept how practically monitorable a nudge is as a good divider 
between permissible and impermissible type-1 nudges. Thaler and Sunstein’s 
solution is a possible one but it overly restricts the set of morally permissible 
nudges. Thus, their rejoinder to TMO is notsatisfying.33
2. Counteracting
A more promising response makes a distinction between the ways in 
which interventions engage our biases. Subliminal messages are morally prob-
lematic because they exploit our biases in a way that other type-1 nudges do 
not—they decrease our sensibility to reasons. Biases prevent our rationality 
status from being optimal. Nudges are intended to counteract already operant 
biases that prevent us from making rational choices. Subliminal messages 
do not counteract biases. Rather, they merely activate them. Thus, in a sense, 
while some nudges (“counteractive”) elevate our rationality status by coun-
teracting our biases and not affecting our sensibility to reasons, other nudges 
(“non-counteractive”) lower it even more under its already suboptimal level 
by activating additional biases on top of the already operant ones and decreas-
ing our sensibility to reasons.
Suppose Jess wants to influence diners to consume healthy desserts 
(e.g. fruit) over less healthy options (e.g. cupcakes/donuts) because doing so 
will improve their welfare. She knows diners are biased to fill their plates with 
what is presented first. And she now learns about subliminal messages. Thus, 
she considers two options to nudge her customers: (i) placing healthier des-
serts first in line or (ii) placing subliminal messages throughout the cafeteria. 
The former is a counteractive nudge. This nudge relies on changing the envi-
ronment to prevent people’s already operant bias (tendency to choose what is 
placed first in line) from leading them towards poor choices (unhealthy over 
healthy food). This nudge utilizes the same already operant bias to influence 
people to make better choices not by eliminating the bias but by counteract-
ing it with a change in the environment (arranging the food so that healthy 
foods are first). Further, counteractive nudges do not decrease people’s sensi-
bility to reasons because, although people might not recognize how the choice 
architecture affects their choices about what they eat (or even recognize that 
this is doing so at all), they can at least recognize the choice architecture itself. 
They recognize that food is placed in some way and that they have options 
to choose from, even if that all happens at System 1 level without reflection. 
The idea here is that, if people started to think about and list all the possible 
reasons they could have for choosing the food they put on their plate, they 
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could at some point list the placement of the food as a reason. What matters 
here is not that they actually list the food placement as a reason for choosing 
the food they put on their plate but that there is a potential for them to do so.
Subliminal messages do not rely on utilizing already operant biases or 
changing the environment but rather on activating additional biases (tenden-
cy to be susceptible to subconscious auditory/visual message). These non- 
counteractive nudges decrease people’s sensibility to reasons because people 
are unable to recognize the subliminal message within the choice architecture. 
Thus, the potential to list the subliminal message as a reason for choosing the 
food is non-existent. It is not only that they cannot actually list the subliminal 
message as a reason but that there is no potential for them to do so. Given 
this distinction, it is possible to offer an account of permissible nudges based 
on how nudges work. A nudge is permissible when it does not decrease our 
sensibility to reasons and impermissible when it does.34 This distinction is 
compatible with the intuition that motivates TMO. That is, that the relation-
ship between autonomy and reflection plays a role in the moral permissibility 
of nudges. The difference is that, for proponents of TMO, actual reflection 
about and determination of the reasons for our choices is necessary for exer-
cising one’s autonomy, and thus for a nudge to be permissible. In my view, 
the potential for such reflection and determination is sufficient for exercising 
one’s autonomy, and thus for a nudge to be permissible.
Whether this rejoinder defeats premise 1 (All interventions that 
engage people only subconsciously are manipulative) or premise 4 (All 
manipulative nudges are morally impermissible) of TMO depends upon 
how we understand manipulation. Central to the manipulation literature, is 
the question of whether manipulation is inherently impermissible. This is a 
difficult question with no clear answer. But independently of what answer 
one adopts, my rejoinder does enough to prove that TMO is unsuccessful 
by showing that there is no moral problem with counteractive nudges even 
when they are type-1 nudges. My rejoinder can be a response to TMO for 
both those who take manipulation as inherently impermissible and those who 
do not. On the one hand, my rejoinder allows for counteractive nudges to be 
manipulative but permissible. The possible position here is that counteractive 
nudges are manipulative because they engage individuals subconsciously, but 
they are morally permissible because they do not decrease one’s sensibility to 
reasons. Thus, they do not prevent one from exercising one’s autonomy. If 
manipulation is not inherently impermissible, then premise 1 is true and my 
rejoinder defeats premise 4 by showing that not all manipulative nudges are 
morally impermissible. On the other hand, my rejoinder also allows for coun-
teractive nudges to be permissible by not being manipulative. The possible 
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position here requires a shift in the focus of the definition of ‘manipulative 
nudge’ from merely engaging the individual subconsciously to not allowing 
the individual to exercise their autonomy.
Thus, counteractive nudges are not manipulative because they al-
low the individual to exercise their autonomy. If manipulation is inherently 
impermissible, then premise 4 is true and my rejoinder defeats premise 1 by 
showing that counteractive nudges are not manipulative.
Disproving TMO proves that not all type-1 nudges are morally im-
permissible. However, this is not the same as proving that all type-1 nudges 
are morally permissible. According to my response, some (non-counteractive) 
type-1 nudges are impermissible. Thus, even though my rejoinder is sufficient 
to reject TMO, it does not eliminate the problem for LPC
because, if correct, it has the consequence that meeting LPC is insuffi-
cient  for an intentional intervention to be morally permissible. One way of 
solving the problem is to add the condition that the intervention must be (iv) 
counteractive. This revision takes care of the challenge from manipulation 
while maintaining that most libertarian paternalistic interventions are morally 
permissible given that this revision minimally restricts the set of nudges that 
are morally permissible under the existing criteria.
CONCLUSION
Independently of whether this revision of LPC is successful, my main 
conclusion holds—i.e. TMO fails as an objection against the moral permissi-
bility of all type-1 nudges. Perhaps my rejoinder to TMO is not more con-
vincing/satisfactory than the other ones considered in this paper. Nonetheless, 
it seems to get at something more reasonable and practically applicable than 
the rest. The rejoinder to TMO from considering the implications fails to 
explain what goes wrong with the objection. Thaler and Sunstein’s rejoinder 
places an unreasonable expectation over nudgees and significantly restricts the 
set of permissible nudges. In contrast, my rejoinder explains what goes wrong 
with the argument for TMO while also suggesting a possible solution that 
does not place an unreasonable expectation over nudgees and just minimally 
restricts the set of permissible nudges. All while complementing the intuition 
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1 Thaler and Sunstein (2009,6). Note that Thaler and Sunstein give 
the original definition of ‘nudge’in terms of economic incentives. 
However, they accept that there are other kinds of incentives 
as well. Thus, a charitable interpretation must be inclusive of 
these other kinds. Note also that the definition given here treats 
‘nudge’ as a noun. However, Thaler and Sunstein—as well as 
most authors who engage with the subject—also use the term as 
a verb to refer to the action of influencing people by means of 
nudges.
2 Nudges steer people in certain directions while maintain their 
freedom of choice. Things like suggestions, warnings, defaults, 
and recomendations are nudges. Things like fines, mandates, 
threats, bans, and direct instruction are not. A nudge is anal-
ogous to how a GPS works because it suggests the best option 
while still allowing people to go in a different direction if they so 
choose.
3 Salespeople, doctors, waiters, website designers, policy makers, 
and professors are all examples of choice architects whonudge.
4 This research was pioneered by the ‘heuristics and biases’work 
of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
which is rooted in dual-process theories. See Tversky and 
Kahneman(1974).
5 Tversky and Kahneman (1974,1124).
6 Some examples of biases are - Anchoring: tendency to prefer 
initial suggestions; Default effect: tendency to favor the default 
(preselected) option; Availability: tendency to weight recent/
easily recalled information more heavily than that which is not 
readily recalled.  
For more examples, empirical evidence, and in-depth discussion 
on heuristics and cognitive biases, see Tversky an Kahneman 
(1974), Kahneman (2011), Ariely (2010), and Thaler and Sun-
stein (2009).
7 Thaler and Sunstein write that “one way to think about this is 
that the Automatic System is your gut reaction and the Reflec-
tive Systemis your conscious thought.” (2009,21).
8 Hansen and Jespersen (2013, 15). For empirical evidence about-
the plate-size default see Wansink(2004).
9 The term ‘mindless eating’ was coined by BrianWansink. It refers 
to consuming food without paying close attention to what and 
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how much is being eaten. See Wansink et al. (2009).
10 Hansen and Jespersen claim that this is a type-1 nudgebecause 
there is usually no conscious decision or choice made in this 
sequence of behavior in regard to how much to eat” (2013, 15).
11 Bovens (2008, 3).
12 This follows from Thaler and Sunstein(2009).
13 This means that it should alter the choice context (how options 
are presented), not the choice content (what options arepresent-
ed).
14 Thaler and Sunstein write that the nudge must be “easyand cheap 
to avoid.” (2009,19).
15 This theory is ‘libertarian’ because it does not limit freedomof 
choice, and ‘paternalistic’ because it focuses on what is best 
forpeople.
16 For empirical evidence see Wansink and Hanks(2013).
17 In this context, what would make the customers better off can be 
defined in terms ofhealth.
18 See Shafir (2013) for how nudges have been applied to public 
policy. See Thaler and Sunstein (2009) for specific examples on 
the increase of retirement savings (105–19), organ donations 
(177–84), healthy food consumption (262–3), and recycling 
(267–8). As well as on the reduction of environmental pollution 
(185–98), energy consumption (258–61), speeding (261–2), 
and urine spillage in public restrooms (268), among otherthings.
19 See Bovens (2008), Nagatsu (2015), Hansen and Jespersen 
(2013), Hausman and Welch(2010).
20 People in general tend to share this perception. Forempirical evi-
dence, see Sunstein (2015 and 2016) and Hangman et al(2016).
21 This is an overarching understanding of ‘manipulation’ drawing 
from various sources within the literature. Sunstein (2015b, 
443–444) considers accounts by Barnhill (2014), Wilkinson 
(2013), Faden & Beauchamp (1986), and Raz(1988).
22 Nagatsu claims that “nudges are ethically problematic to the 
extent that they change individual behavior in such a way that is 
not responsive to the agent’s reasoning process” (2015,487).
23 Theword‘subliminal’means‘belowtreshold’.Morespecifically, below 
the treshhold of consciousness. Here I am using ‘subliminal 
messages’ to refer to either auditory or visual messages presented 
below the average limits of human perception. In other words, to 
a signal or message that is typically unperceived consciously, yet 
perceivedsubconsciously.
24 Whether or not subliminal messages are nudges is contested. 
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Some critics argue that subliminal messages are not nudges. 
However, some others, including Thaler and Sunstein, find 
it difficult to differentiate the two because all it takes for an 
intervention to be a nudge is for it to preserve freedom of choice. 
That is, to not limit options or attach incentives or consequences 
to any of them. Since subliminal messages  do not do any of this, 
it is reasonable to think that they are nudges. However, what is 
commonly resistedisthattheyaremorallypermissible.Thus,Tha-
lerandSunsteinargue that even if nudges, subliminal messages 
are not instances of Libertarian Paternalism. My argument in 
this paper assumes that subliminal messages are nudges. More 
specifically, type-1 nudges given that they engage us only sub-
consciously.
25 Hausman and Welch (2010,128).
26 Hausman and Welch (2010,127).
27 In contrast, Hansen and Jespersen claim that type-2 nudges 
facilitate and increase freedom of choice and “empowerment” by 
meansof reflective engagement (2013,24).
28 Recall that LPC holds that for an intentional intervention to be 
morally permissible, it has to be (i) a nudge, (ii) transparent, and 
(iii) aimed toward the welfare of those being nudged.
29 This evaluation of TMO follows the ‘Moorean Shift’, which is a 
way of objecting to an argument by appealing to commonsense. 
That is,by showing that rejecting its conclusion is more reason-
able than accepting the conjunction of its premises. The move 
was originally proposed by GEMoore in response to skepticism. 
See Moore(1939).
30 Thaler and Sunstein claim that the “manipulation of this kindis 
objectionable precisely because it is invisible and thus impossible 
to monitor” (2009, 246).
31 Note that a person with the right technological equipment could 
detect messages that would be undetectable otherwise. Thaler 
and Sunstein’s claim, then, does not mean that subliminal mes-
sages are in fact “iimpossible” to monitor but perhaps only that 
they are practicallyundetectable.
32 This is the case even more so if the nudgee is unaware ofthe con-
cept of nudging and the biases that influence their thinking.
33 Note, too, that there is another way in which Thaler and Sun-
stein’s distinction restricts the set of morally permissible nudges 
even more. It rules out a lot of type-2 nudges for the reasons 
I mention above having to do with type-2 nudges’ reliance on 
type-1 nudges. This is the case because agreat
47
34 deal of type-1 nudges are not practically monitorable. Thus, if 
non-practically monitorable type-1 nudges are impermissible, 
then all the type-2 nudges that rely on them are impermissible 
as well.
35 Nudges need not increase our sensibility to reasons in order to 
be permissible. All that matters is that they do not decrease our 
sensibility.
36 Thanks to Jon Matheson for providing helpful feedback on this 
paper.

